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Short message service (SMS) is a very popular and easy to use communications technology for mobile 
phone devices. Originally, this service was not designed to transmit secured data, so the security was 
not an important issue during its design. Yet today, it is sometimes used to exchange sensitive 
information between communicating parties. This paper proposes an alternative solution that provides 
a peer-to-peer SMS security that guarantees provision of confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation security services. A hybrid cryptographic scheme has been used which combines the 
NTRU and AES-Rijndael algorithms to achieve more robust functionality. For implementation, a mobile 
information device application (MIDlet) has been developed in J2ME to introduce a required security 
services for SMS. The developed application is tested on real equipment such as a Nokia N70. It is able 
to achieve all the required cryptographic operations completely on the users Õ  mobile phone in less than 
one second for each operation, and thus the mobile phone performance still remains effective. 
 
Key words: Public key cryptography, NTRU, SMS security, peer to peer, confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
and non-repudiation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Various types of tools have been created to make human 
communications simpler and faster. The most significant 
communication tool is the modern telephone which was 
first invented by Sir Alexander Graham Bell in the 19th 
century. Since then, communication devices have 
evolved into very advanced and sophisticated tools. The 
demand for such devices is tremendous as in the second 
quarter of 2009, there were more than 4.3 billion mobile 
subscribers worldwide compared to 3 billion mobile 
subscribers in 2008 and 2.5 billion mobile subscribers in 
2007 (GSMWorld, 2009b). The majority of them are 
sending and receiving not only casual greetings, but also 
important data such as social security numbers, bank 
account details, passwords, and so on and so forth. In 
some cases, this data may also include very private 
information reserved for the personal viewing of the legal 
recipient. 
The message journey starts from the  mobile  phone  to  
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the BTS (base transceiver station) over the radio waves. 
It is transmitted in encrypted format by using A5 algorithm 
(GSMWorld, 2009a). Usually, the message transmits in 
unencrypted format in the mobile operator’s network to 
the message center and then stores it until its delivered 
to the destination (Hassinen, 2006). In September 2003, 
a group of researchers introduced a practical cipher text-
only cryptanalysis for GSM encrypted communication, 
and launched active attacks on the GSM protocols. They 
describe a cipher text-only attack on A5/2 that merely 
requires a few dozen milliseconds of encrypted off-the-air 
cellular conversation to find the correct key in less than a 
second on a personal computer (Barkan et al., 2008). It is 
clear that the transmitted data through the mobile 
networks is unsecured. Nowadays, the visibility of 
security applications is wide; the term security presented 
in the scholar papers side by side with terms such as 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, 
privacy and data protection. Sometimes it goes beyond 
that to present the privacy statements for surveys and 
interviews. It may not be exaggerating if we say e-life 
equals to security, researchers state many words on the 
role  played  by  security  on  the life. Haque  et al. (2009) 
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says “only protected transactions, have significant impact 
on consumers’ perception about e-banking security 
(Hashim et al., 2010) says “Privacy and security are very 
important issues being discussed in the literature on the 
current use of ICT”. In addition to that, there are ethics 
and privacy statements recorded in the first page of 
surveys such as (Babalola et al., 2006; Findik et al., 
2010; Gullu and Yilmaz, 2010; Shittu et al., 2007). 
Many researchers have proposed solutions to secure 
the mobile phone communication by using public key 
cryptography such as Hassinen, 2006; Anuar et al., 2008; 
Narendiran et al., 2009; Jimale, 2008; Kuen, 2008. 
However all the solutions are based on the server 
architecture and the mobile operator or service provider 
controls the servers. The servers in such architecture are 
controlling the cryptographic key generations such as 
(Kuen, 2008; Zhao et al., 2008) key distributions and 
authenticate the users as well (Jimale, 2008; Kuen, 
2008). One of the main reasons for not implementing 
public key cryptography in non-server architecture is the 
restricted resources (that is, computing power and 
storage capacity) in the mobile phone devices. The 
second important reason is the user’s authentication 
scheme. How the user can authenticate the sender’s 
entity in non-server architecture systems. We believe that 
we can overcome these problems either; by using the 
modern technologies in the mobile phone devices or by 
using additional security techniques. 
 
 
Current SMS security solutions 
 
In this review for SMS security solutions we focus on 
three aspects; firstly, the solution’s ability to provide peer-
to-peer SMS security. Secondly, the security services 
which are provided by the solution, in this case we give 
attention to four main security services; confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Thirdly, the 
solution’s independency, some solutions depend on the 
mobile network operator servers or the service provider 
servers to achieve some of its functions such as 
authentication. Marko and Smile (2003), proposed the 
cryptographic methods based on the theory of quasi 
groups to secure SMS messages. They used the same 
key for encryption and decryption. Therefore, we can 
consider a quasi group as a symmetric cryptography. 
Their solution provides peer-to-peer confidentiality but 
does not provide sender authentication and message 
integrity. Moreover, they did not propose any method for 
exchanging the secret key and assumed that users can 
handle those themselves before communicating. 
Ratshinanga et al. (2004) proposed a protocol to 
secure SMS communication between a client and a 
server using the WMA package. They used asymmetric 
cryptography (RSA) and symmetric cryptography 
(AES/CTR) and password authentication strategy to 
ensure   the  confidentiality   and   integrity   of   the  SMS 
 
 
 
 
communication. Their solution is designed to secure the 
communication between the user (that is, mobile phone 
device) and the server (that is, the mobile network 
operator servers). If the server is compromised by a 
hacker, the whole protocol will fail because the hacker 
can disguise himself as the legitimate party using the 
stolen information. So it is not fully secure. Moreover, it 
provides the confidentiality and integrity, but the solution 
can’t provide a non-repudiation security service. (Croft 
and Olivier, 2005) used one-time pads using shared 
information between the communicating peers and the 
GSM network servers. The keys generated from this 
shared information using hashing techniques, is 
sufficiently random for use in their approximated one-time 
pad. These keys should be unique for every SMS, 
assuming that GSM server will change the Temporary 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) for every SMS. The 
SMS has to decrypt at Mobile Switching Center (MSC) 
where it resides as a plain text. The solution depends on 
the mobile network operator for some of their solution 
events such as authenticating the users and the change 
of the TMSI after using it in an encryption process. 
Moreover, it did not provide peer-to-peer encryption 
because the message has to be decrypted in the mobile 
network and encrypted again then sent to the recipient. If 
an attacker gains the access to the mobile operator 
network, the confidentiality will be lost because the SMS 
is in plain text format at MSC. 
Lisonek and Drahanský (2008) used asymmetric 
cryptography (that is, RSA) to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. They 
assumed that the certificate authority will handle the 
generating of the certificates, and the users have to 
download the certificate from the certificate authority 
server on their own through the internet. In general, their 
solution can provide the peer-to-peer SMS security, as 
well as guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation security services. 
However, the dependence on a certificate authority to 
generate the certificate will complicate the solution 
implementation for the individuals. Anuar et al. (2008) 
proposed the SMS/MMS encryption solution. They used 
both of symmetric cryptography (that is, AES) and 
asymmetric cryptography (that is, RSA) to provide two 
levels of secure mobile communication, internal SMS 
(symmetric encryption: AES), and confidential SMS 
(asymmetric encryption: RSA). For the asymmetric 
cryptography, users have to apply for a digital certificate 
with a certificate authority server before starting to use 
their solution. After the certificate is issued by the 
authority server, users must browse the public key 
cryptography directory on the server to download the 
public key. This directory will provide the information 
about all users’ certificate and its status. However, their 
solution provides the confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation, but it depends on the 
certificate  authority  server to generate the cryptographic 
  
 
 
 
             
       
 
Confidentiality and Independency 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Symmetric cryptography with non-server architecture. 
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Figure 2. Asymmetric cryptography with server architecture. 
 
 
 
keys and to authenticate the users. Toorani and Shirazi 
(2008) introduced a new secure application layer protocol 
called SSMS. This protocol can be used to embed the 
desired security attributes in the SMS messages. It acts 
as a secure bearer in the m-payment systems. SSMS 
embeds the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and 
non-repudiation in the SMS messages. It provides an 
elliptic curve-based public key (ECC) solution that uses 
public keys for the secret key establishment of a 
symmetric encryption. However, it relies on the third party 
servers (that is, KGS (Key Generating Server), OCSP 
(Online Certificate Status Protocol) server) as part of the 
solution. This dependency demands a third party 
approval in its implementation. 
Zhao et al. (2008) proposed a new solution for a 
secure messaging channel using identity-based 
cryptography. This solution provides peer-to-peer security 
from service provider to mobile users, and between 
mobile users. Identity-based cryptography specifies a 
cryptosystem in which both public and private keys are 
based on the identities of the users. Such a scheme has 
the property that a user’s public key is an easily 
calculated function of his identity, while a user’s private 
key can be calculated for him by a trusted authority, 
called    private   key   generator   (PKG).   Identity- based 
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cryptography needs a setup phase in which system 
parameters are distributed to its users. These parameters 
include system public key, master key, private key of 
each user, and algorithms to be used for encryption and 
decryption as well as hashing (Zhao et al., 2008). This 
scheme provides integrity, confidentiality and 
authentication of SMS by binding a message with a 
private key. However, it does not provide non-repudiation 
since the service provider provides the private key to a 
user, thus the user can simply deny having sent a 
message signed with his private key. Moreover, the 
solution depends on the mobile network operator which 
makes its implementation for individual users more 
difficult. 
Wu and Tan (2009b) proposed a high security 
communication protocol for SMS. They used the RSA-
1024 asymmetric algorithm and AES and 3DES 
symmetric algorithms to provide a peer-to-peer secure 
channel between server-side and mobile terminal. They 
used MD5 and SHA1 algorithms to check messages 
integrity. Due to their using the asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithms, symmetric cryptographic algorithms and 
hashing algorithms they were able to ensure confiden-
tiality, integrity and non-repudiation of SMS messages. 
However, their solution is server-based solution which 
can be implemented only by the mobile network operator. 
From the literature we found many research papers is 
concerning SMS encryption. Some of them have 
proposed symmetric cryptography as a solution that can 
provide confidentiality for SMS communication. These 
proposals are arguable since symmetric key cryptogra-
phy is not able to provide the sender authentication, non-
repudiation and the message integrity. In Figure 1, we 
can see the symmetric cryptography in non-server 
architecture that can guarantee provision confidentiality 
and independency but not sender authentication and 
non-repudiation. On the other hand, some others 
researchers chose to use the asymmetric cryptography 
as a solution to provide the confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity and non-repudiation services of SMS communi-
cation. However, this is also not the best solution and that 
because, asymmetric cryptography requires a lot of 
computational and storage resources to calculate and 
store public and private keys. Figure 2 shows the use of 
the asymmetric cryptography usually implemented in 
server-architecture security systems due to its high 
computing resources requirements. However, if the 
server is compromised, the whole security system will 
fail. 
Non-server applications have been successfully 
implemented and tested to secure peer-to-peer 
communications, the success factor was the independency 
of the application from the operator server or any other 
server. However, this success is not fully acceptable 
since, this kind of solution has not provided the integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. In addition to that, 
implementation of non-server application using public key 
cryptography  is  a  challenge  with  the  current  methods  
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Figure 3. Non-server architecture using public key cryptography. 
 
 
 
(that is, RSA, ECC and ElGamal), these algorithms can 
provide solutions with the integrity, authentication and 
non-repudiation, however, it cannot be fully implemented 
without servers. Figure 3 depicts the final aim for this 
research; which is providing a complete security solution 
for peer-to-peer SMS communication that guarantee 
provision of confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation and independency security services.  
 
 
SMS encryption 
 
One of the most successful solutions for the security 
weakness on the mobile network is cryptography. 
Cryptography can be defined as the conversion of data 
into a scrambled code and then sending it to the 
recipient; the scrambled code can be decrypted to 
retrieve the original data once it is received. It has two 
main forms for encrypting data; symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption. The first is symmetric key 
cryptography, which is also called secret key 
cryptography. It is a type of cryptography where the same 
key is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. While 
the second is asymmetric key cryptography which is 
referred to as public-key cryptography, it uses two keys. 
One is the private key that must be kept private and only 
known by its owner and the second is the public key that 
can be made known to all communication participants. 
Data encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only 
by the private key, and data signed with the private key 
can only be verified with the public key. In general, the 
implementation of cryptography does not require any 
modification to the mobile network structure or any 
installation for additional hardware. 
Nevertheless, both the two forms of cryptography have 
some advantages as well as some drawbacks. 
Symmetric key algorithms are generally much less 
computationally intensive, unlike asymmetric key 
algorithms calculations that take longer than symmetric 
key calculations. This is because, they involve the use of 
exponentiation of very large numbers which  in  turn  take  
 
 
 
 
longer to compute and  need  more  memory  to  do  the 
calculations and store the keys. Moreover, symmetric key 
algorithms presume that the communicating parties have 
agreed on a key and are able to exchange that key in a 
secure manner before communicating. While, in 
asymmetric key algorithms there is no need to exchange 
keys in a secret manner. Another difference is symmetric 
key algorithms cannot provide authentication, non-
repudiation and the message originality. Yet, asymmetric 
key algorithms can provide authentication, non-
repudiation and the message integrity by signing the 
message with the private key while verifying with the 
public key. However, a combination of the asymmetric 
cryptography and symmetric cryptography can achieve 
more robust functionality.  
 
 
Server architecture vs. non-server architecture 
 
Usually, the mobile communications security solutions 
that are based on public key cryptography rely on the 
mobile phone network operator or service provider as 
part of the proposed solutions. Generally, the server 
architecture solutions need for additional hardware (that 
is, servers) and as result to a qualified staff to maintain 
the servers. Moreover, server architecture mobile security 
systems user has to get the mobile network operator or 
the service provider approval because it depends on their 
servers. Besides the overhead cost of communication is 
increased due to users need to access to the servers in 
many cases such as uploading and downloading the 
cryptographic keys. We do not expect that the mobile 
operators will provide security services to the transmitted 
data through the SMS service for individuals, at least not 
in the near future. 
On the other hand, non-server architecture mobile 
communications security solutions are implementable for 
individuals due to its independency from the mobile 
phone network operator or service provider. Thus the 
user does not need to make any agreement with the 
mobile phone network operator or service provider. As a 
result, all the cryptographic operations are achieved on 
the user’s mobile phone. Moreover, the overhead costs of 
communication are less than server architecture system. 
This is because the communication between the user and 
the server for authenticating purposes are not required. 
Most of the current non-server mobile security systems 
are based on symmetric cryptographic algorithms. For 
example, CryptoGraf messaging software is used to 
encrypt messages with AES algorithm within the mobile 
phones without requiring any servers (Wu and Tan, 
2009b). 
 
 
Research objectives  
 
1. To study the existing SMS encryption techniques. 
2. To  identify  the  appropriate technique for peer-to-peer  
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Table 1. Preliminary experimental results (Wu and Tan, 2009b). 
 
 NTRU-251 (ms) RSA-1024 (ms) 
Key generation time 9617 2090509 
Encryption time 515 1505 
Decryption time 1132 35102 
 
 
 
SMS security. 
3. To propose an alternative solution for securing SMS. 
4. To develop and test the proposed technique in regards 
to confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation services. 
 
 
Research questions 
 
1. What are the current end-to-end SMS communication 
security solutions weaknesses? 
2. How we can develop the end-to-end SMS security 
solution which guarantees the confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation security services?  
3. How we can provide the end-to-end SMS security 
without depending on mobile network operator or third 
party? 
4. How we can develop a solution for end-to-end SMS 
security that is implementable by individuals as well as by 
the commercial ones?  
 
 
Proposed solution 
 
The public key cryptography is able to provide the 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation security services needed to secure SMS. But 
it needs a high computing power, so it is usually used in 
server architecture mobile security systems. Although the 
implementation of public key cryptography in server 
architecture mobile security systems provides high level 
of security, the risk of the server penetration by hackers 
is also possible (Ratshinanga et al., 2004) and then the 
whole system security will fail. In non-server architecture 
mobile security systems, all the cryptographic operations 
will be achieved in the user mobile phone device. 
Therefore, most of the existing non-server architecture 
mobile phone security solutions are based on symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms due to its low demands for 
computing power, but such algorithms are unable to 
provide all the required security services (Wu and Tan, 
2009a). Unlike the symmetric cryptographic algorithms, 
the asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are able to 
provide all the required security services, but they need 
higher computing power. Thus, to implement asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithms in non-server architecture 
mobile security systems, we must select an asymmetric 
cryptographic   algorithm   with   low    computing    power  
demand. 
 
 
Selected public key algorithm 
 
In 1996, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher and Joseph H. 
Silverman introduced a new public key cryptographic 
algorithm based on the shortest vector problem in a 
lattice. The main advantage of this algorithm is that it 
runs much faster with lower memory requirement than 
conventional public key algorithms such as RSA. The 
security of the NTRU cryptosystem comes from the 
interaction of the polynomial mixing system with the 
independence of reduction modulo two relatively prime 
integers p and q (Hoffstein et al., 1998). 
 
 
NTRU performance 
 
NTRU is a collection of mathematical algorithms based 
on manipulating lists of very small integers and 
polynomials. This allows NTRU to achieve high speeds 
with the use of minimal computing power. Despite the 
RSA cryptosystem being the most popular public key 
system, it requires more computing power than other 
public key systems such as ECC and NTRU. Most of the 
smart cards are unable to process RSA 1024 key lengths 
due to the high computing power required. Thus, there is 
an increasing need for another public key system which 
is able to provide the same level of security but at the 
same time needs less computing power at the same time. 
The most suitable alternative is NTRU cryptosystem, due 
to its low requirement of computing power and its ability 
to provide an equivalent level of security to RSA 1024 
(Challa and Pradhan, 2007). 
Challa and Pradhan in 2007, published a comparison 
between RSA and NTRU in an experimental study. Their 
study shows that NTRU requires approximately only one 
third of the time that RSA requires in the encryption 
process and also, it requires only one seventh of the time 
that RSA needed for the decryption process. Shen et al. 
in 2009 made an experiment on the performance of 
enhanced NTRU-251 and compared it with RSA-1024 in 
the mobile java emulator. The results of the experiment 
are shown in Table 1. The results show that NTRU is 217 
times faster than RSA in key generation and NTRU is 
also three times faster than RSA in the encryption 
process.  Moreover, NTRU is 31 times faster than RSA in  
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Table 2. NTRU plaintext and cipher text block sizes (NTRUCryptosystems, 2003). 
 
Padding mode 
Key strength Cipher text size 
SVES-1 Padding SVES-2 Padding SVES-3 Padding 
NTRU-251 251 21 20 20 
NTRU-347 347 29 28 N/A 
NTRU-503 503 42 41 N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. NTRU and AES usage in the system. 
 
 
 
the decryption process. 
 
 
NTRU limitations 
 
Although, the NTRU algorithm is much faster than RSA 
and ECC and requires less computing power, it also has 
some limitations, such as: (1) The NTRU algorithms 
include an encryption algorithm NTRUEncrypt which is 
used for encryption and decryption and a signature 
algorithm NTRUSign which is used for digital signature 
purpose. This means we have to use NTRUEncrypt key 
pair for encryption or decryption processes and another 
NTRUSign key pair for digital signature processes. The 
keys in NTRU are not interchangeable, we can encrypt 
only with the public key and decrypt only with the private 
key. Consequently, NTRU user has to use two pairs of 
keys, one for encryption or decryption and another for the 
digital signature. (2) The security level of asymmetric 
cryptography algorithms does not only depend on the 
difficulty of the problem but also on how the plain text is 
padded so as to prevent attacks. The padding mode 
affects the size of the plaintext that can be encrypted in a 
single block. The common padding technique that is used 
with NTRU is SVES-3. The following table shows some of 
the padding techniques. It also shows the plain text block 
size and the cipher text block size. With regards to mobile 
text message size, padding will increase the size of 
encrypted message (NTRUCryptosystems, 2003). The 
Table 2 shows the cipher text size according to which 
passing mode is used and which key strength is required. 
NTRU algorithm is fast enough to achieve all 
cryptographic operations on the mobile phone devices, 
but it has one drawback, it is the cipher text size. NTRU 
cipher text is large, such that the size of the encrypted 
SMS with NTRU also results in a large output. We used 
the NTRU keys with strength 251, which provide high 
level of security equivalent to RSA 1024 key strength for 
our solution. The use for NTRU 251 key strength with 
SVES-3 padding mode will produce cipher text with size 
251 byte for each block with size 20 byte. This means 
that an SMS with a size of 140 byte will break down into 
seven blocks to encrypt and the cipher text will be 251 
multiplied by 7 and that is equal to 1757 byte. Therefore, 
we used NTRU for securing the key exchange sessions, 
and we used symmetric algorithm AES-Rijndael to secure 
the ordinary messages. Figure 4 shows the usage of the 
NTRU and AES-Rijndael algorithms in the proposed 
system. 
 
 
Security services 
 
The most important security services that must be 
provided by mobile security solutions are: confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. In this part 
of the paper we will discuss how the proposed solution 
will achieve these services on the mobile phone devices 
without adding any additional hardware or relying on third 
party such as mobile network operator, at the same time 
the solution must be achieved without negative effects on 
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Figure 5. Security services. 
 
 
 
the mobile phone’s performance. Figure 5 illustrates how 
the solution achieves all the security services. Some 
abbreviations that are used in Figure 5 are: 
 
m: the original message in plain text format. 
M: the encrypted message in cipher text format. 
F_M: the final encrypted message which contain the 
encrypted message and which is signed by the sender. 
M_digest: the hashing value for encrypted message M 
with SHA1 hashing algorithm. 
M_sign: the signed value for M_digest value with 
A_SPriK by using NTRUSign algorithm. 
B_PubK: the user B NTRUEncrypt public key. 
B_PriK: the user B NTRUEncrypt private key. 
A_SPriK: the user A NTRUSign private key. 
A_SPubK: the user A NTRUSign public key. 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality  is the  security service which ensures that 
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the data will NOT be disclosed for unauthorized parties 
during its transmission. It is the main security service 
which is an essential component in any security system. 
Encryption is the most common technique used to 
provide confidentiality security service. We use the NTRU 
public/private keys to encrypt the key exchange sessions, 
and we use the AES-Rijndael to encrypt the messages. 
 
 
Integrity 
 
Integrity is the security service which ensures that data is 
not changed during its transmission from the sender to 
the receiver. Usually the integrity can be achieved by 
hashing the encrypted message and encrypting the 
message hashing then send it with the message to the 
receiver. Once the receiver receives the message, he will 
decrypt the encrypted message hashing and compare it 
with his own hashing on the received message. If the 
receiver’s message hashing equals to the sender’s 
message hashing, then the message has sound integrity, 
otherwise the message has been modified. We achieve 
the integrity in our solution by using NTRUSign. 
NTRUSign has a pair of keys; one for signing the 
message and another for verifying the signed message. 
The SHA1 algorithm is used to hash the message then 
the message digest can be signed with the NTRUSign 
private key. Once the message is received the 
NTRUSign public key can be used for verifying the 
received message. 
 
 
Non-repudiation 
 
Non-repudiation is the security service that prevents the 
sender and the receiver from denying their participating in 
message transmission. Thus, when a message is sent, 
the receiver can prove that the alleged sender in fact sent 
the message. Similarly, when a message is received, the 
sender can prove that the alleged receiver in fact 
received the message (Stallings, 2005). The most 
common technique to provide non-repudiation security 
service is the digital signature. In our solution a sender 
will sign the encrypted message hashing with his 
NTRUSign private key, and the receiver can verify that 
signature with the sender’s NTRUSign public key. 
 
 
Authentication 
 
Authentication is the assurance that the communicating 
entity is the one that it claims to be (Stallings, 2005). This 
service provides a system with the capability to verify that 
a user is the actual one he or she claims to be based on 
what the user knows or have. For authentication 
purposes users have to sign the messages that they are 
going  to  send  with   their   NTRUSign  private  key,   the  
 
 
 
 
receiver will be able to verify that signature with the 
NTRUSign public key which they have already received 
during a key exchange session. Thus users will be able 
to make certain of the identity of the sender within their 
mobiles phone, without the need to access to the third 
party severs to check the sender’s authenticity. 
The problem is in the first contact; before the users 
exchange the keys among them they can’t communicate 
or authenticate each other. For the first time contact 
users can’t authenticate the sender, because they didn’t 
have the sender’s NTRUSign public key. So the difficulty 
is how we can authenticate the sender without his digital 
signature. To solve this problem, in our proposed solution 
the developed application follows some techniques to 
exchange the cryptographic keys and for the first time, 
these techniques are as follows: 
 
1. Before the user starts any connection, one must add 
the other party’s information to the application contacts 
list, such as name, group name and phone number in 
international format. Therefore any request from any 
party that does not exist in the application contacts list 
will be ignored immediately. 
2. The application uses a sequence number for each 
incoming and outgoing messages from each contact in 
the contacts list. Therefore, any message with a wrong 
sequence number will be immediately ignored by the 
application. 
3. The application uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to 
make agreement on a temporary secret key which is 
used with the AES algorithm to encrypt the public key 
(NTRUEncrypt public keys and NTRUSign public keys) 
and then exchange it in an encrypted format in session 
keys exchange prior to the first contact. 
 
 
Key exchange session protocol 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the key exchange session steps. User 
X can start the key exchange session immediately after 
he generates his public keys and adds Y contact 
information to his contacts list. He can start a key 
exchange session by calculating the value of A 
depending on the secretly generated value a, and the 
share secret parameters g and p, and send the value of A 
with request to start a key exchange session. User Y can 
reject the session if not ready to go through the key 
exchange session steps, he can also accept the request 
and as result he must calculate the value of B and send it 
back to X with accept message. 
User X will be able to calculate the value of K once he 
receives the value of B from the user Y. user Y also will 
be able to calculate same key K depending on the value 
of A which is already received from user X in request 
message. Thus, the users X and Y will obtain the same 
secret key which they can use for one time only to 
encrypt their  public  key  and  exchange it. For  next  key  
 Al-bakri and Kiah        3463 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Key exchange session. 
 
 
 
exchange session users can use NTRU public keys to 
encrypt and sign the new cryptographic keys before 
exchanging them. 
 
 
Proposed solution implementation 
 
Java is an object-oriented programming language that 
compiles the program to byte code (.class files) that runs 
on a virtual machine. The compiled byte code is then 
ready to be executed within a special virtual environment 
known as the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The JVM acts 
as a consistent layer between byte code and the actual 
machine instructions. The goal of the virtual machine 
layer is to protect the underlying device from the damage 
executable code might cause. Byte code instructions are 
translated into machine-specific instructions by the JVM 
at runtime. This enables programmers to write one 
program and run it on different operating systems. The 
expression often used to sum up the work of the JVM is 
“Write once, run anywhere” (Flynt and Wells, 2008). 
 
 
J2ME 
 
The main goal of the Java 2 Mobile Edition (J2ME) is to 
provide an extensible yet highly portable, minimum-
footprint, Java implementation that can run on a wide 
variety of network devices with constant or intermittent 
network connectivity. J2ME consists of a light-weight of 
JVM known as Kauai virtual machine (KVM) capable of 
providing a secure and  clean  execution  environment  in 
resource-constrained mobile devices such as mobile 
phone devices. 
 
 
RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TEST 
 
We selected four of Nokia devices to test the NTRU 
speed; Nokia N70, Nokia N73, Nokia N93 and Nokia 
5800 Xpress Music; the Nokia N70 belongs to the second 
generation of Nokia mobile devices, and it operates with 
symbian operating system v8.1a. It has ARM9 CPU with 
a 220 MHz clock rate. It has 22MB internal memory and it 
supports extension memory from MMC type. Next, is the 
Nokia N73 is from the third generation and operates with 
the developed version of symbian operating system, 
which is symbian OS v9.1. This model has Dual ARM 9 
CPU with 220 MHz clock rate. It has 42 MB internal 
memory and 2 GB Mini SD as extended memory. 
Followed by the Nokia N93 which belongs to the third 
generation, yet it has Dual ARM 11 CPU with 332 MHz 
clock rate. It also operates with the symbian operating 
system v9.1. This model has 50MB internal memory and 
2 GB Mini SD as extended memory. Finally: Nokia 5800 
Xpress Music it the most modern one among the rest. It 
belongs to the fifth generation, and operates with the 
Symbian OS v9.4. This model has ARM 11 CPU with 434 
MHz clock rate. It also has 81MB internal memory with 
16GB Mini SD as extended memory (Nokia, 2009). 
We performed tests on key generation, encryption and 
decryption, as well as signing and verifying operations for 
one hundred times and then calculated the averages. 
Table 3  shows  the  average  of  elapsed time on the real
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Table 3. NTRU tests on real equipment. 
 
Cryptographic operation Nokia N70 Nokia N73 Nokia N93 Nokia 5800 Express  
Public keys generation 142 77 53 29  
Encryption 14 12 6 3 
Decryption 32 13 10 5 
Data size = 1 block =20 Byte. 
Sign 38 42 24 14 
Verify 28 23 17 8 
Data size = 20 byte. 
 
Total tests: 100 for each. Key Strength: NTRU251. Time Measurement: milliseconds. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Time taken for cryptographic operation vs. CPU speed of a mobile device. 
 
 
 
equipment for each model. The results in Table 3 that 
shows that the NTRU algorithm performed very well on 
the mobile devices and there are no negative effects on 
the mobile devices’ performance. Figure 7 shows that the 
time will decrease when the CPU clock rates increased. 
From the results above we notice that NTRU does not 
require high computing ability, which makes it the best 
alternatives for mobile devices. Moreover, the NTRU 
algorithm will not slow the mobile phone performance. 
 
 
Security strength  
 
The various stages of the proposed solution and the 
potential risks are discussed here. Subsequently, we will 
highlight on how to protect the users from the risk. The 
proposed scheme has two main stages: the exchange of 
cryptographic keys and the exchange encrypted 
messages safely. 
 
 
Keys exchange session 
 
The potential risk lies in assuming that the attacker is 
able to capture the exchanged messages during the keys  
exchange session. To analyse this case, we will focus  on  
the keys exchange between two users X and Y and the 
potential risks of interception of the messages by the 
attacker Z. The first message is the request message for 
the keys exchange. The first message is sent from X to Y 
and it holds the value of A. Assuming that the attacker Z 
manages to capture this message, he/she will unable to 
obtain the value of key K by only depending on the value 
of A. The second message is the reply message which is 
sent from Y to X. This message is to accept the 
exchange of keys and it contains the value of B. 
Assuming that the attacker Z manages to capture this 
message, he/she will not be able to obtain the value of 
key K, because the value a is kept secret; this value is 
only known by user X, as well as the value of b which is 
kept secret by user Y. In addition, the lack of knowledge 
of Diffie-Hellman algorithm parameters g and p will make 
the calculating of the key K value impossible. 
The third and fourth messages are the encrypted 
messages using the key K and AES-Rijndael algorithm, 
which hold the users' NTRU public keys. Even if the 
attacker could capture the messages; he/she will fail to 
decrypt them and will not know the users’ NTRU public 
keys because of lack of knowledge of the value of key K. 
Moreover, the attacker Z will fail to start a key exchange 
session because of lack of knowledge of the Diffie-
Hellman  parameters,  and  because of lack of knowledge  
  
 
 
 
of the port number, also the solution will reject his request 
because his contact numbers are not in the contacts list. 
Therefore, the user will be confident after the completion 
of the keys exchange session that the process has been 
made with the right person. In addition, even if the 
attacker Z successfully impersonated one of the parties, 
he/she will fail to complete a successful keys exchange 
with the other user due to lack of knowledge of the Diffie-
Hellman parameters that are needed to complete the 
process of making agreement on a shred secret key with 
the other user.  
 
 
Exchanging encrypted messages 
 
The key exchange stage is only a temporary stage and 
needed only in the first contact between the users. Once 
the key exchange has accomplished successfully the 
next stage will start, which is exchanging encrypted 
messages. This stage is the permanent and fixed stage. 
At this stage, users will be able to send and received the 
encrypted and signed messages. They also will be able 
to exchange the new updates for the current keys in 
encrypted and signed messages. As a result, they will 
able to verify the identity of the sender of any message 
and they can ignore any spurious message. Since the 
attacker fails to benefit from any of the captured 
messages during the keys exchange session in the 
process of violation of the privacy of any party to the 
communication, he also will not be able to decrypt the 
captured encrypted messages later. Thus we can say 
that the proposed non-server security scheme is capable 
to provide a high level of security for users.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Using a hybrid cryptographic scheme of NTRU and AES-
Rijndael allows us to provide peer-to-peer SMS security 
solution which can be implementable in non-server 
architecture mobile security systems. It provides all the 
necessary security services such as confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of the user. 
The developed solution is not only for commercial and 
governmental use but for the average individuals as well. 
The developed solution runs fast enough so it has no 
slowdown on the mobile deviceÕ s response, as well as it 
does not need the addition of extra hardware. Moreover, 
it is completely independent from the mobile network 
operator or any other third party As a result it is 
implementable by the individuals as well as commercially. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This project has been funded in part by University of 
Malaya   with  grant  number  UMRG- RG029/09ICT. The  
Al-bakri and Kiah        3465 
 
 
 
author would like to acknowledge the people who helped 
or contributed in any way. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anuar N, Kuen L, Zakaria O, Gani A, Wahab A (2008). GSM mobile 
SMS/MMS using public key infrastructure: m-PKI. WSEAS 
Transactions on Computers, 7(8): 1219-1229. 
Babalola O, Shittu L, Adesanya O, Jewo I, Oyewopo O, Ashiru O 
(2006). Pregnancy Outcome Following Swim Up Preparation Of Both 
Fresh and Cryopreserved Spermatozoa. Sci. Res. Essays, 1(3): 103-
107. 
Barkan E, Biham E, Keller N (2008). Instant Ciphertext-Only 
Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication. J. Cryptol., 21(3): 
392-429. 
Challa N, Pradhan J (2007). Performance Analysis of Public key 
Cryptographic Systems RSA and NTRU. IJCSNS Int. J. Comput. Sci. 
Network Security, 7: 87-96. 
Croft NJ, Olivier MS (2005). Using approximate one-time pad to secure 
short messaging Service (SMS), pp. 71-76. 
Findik KT, Tasdemir  S,  Sahin I (2010). The use of artificial neural 
network for prediction of grain size of 17-4 pH stainless steel 
powders. Sci. Res. Essays, 5(11): 1274-1283. 
Flynt JP, Wells MJ (2008). Java ME Game Programming. 
GSMWorld (2009a). GSM Security Algorithms. Retrieved 2-9-2009, 
from http://www.gsmworld.com/our-work/programmes-and-
initiatives/fraud-and-security/gsm_security_algorithms.htm. 
GSMWorld (2009b). Market Data Summary (Q2 2009). Retrieved 2-9-
2009, from http://www.gsmworld.com/newsroom/market-
data/market_data_summary.htm 
Gullu M, Yilmaz I (2010). Outlier detection for geodetic nets using 
ADALINE learning algorithm. Sci. Res. Essays, 5(5): 440-447. 
Haque A, Tarofder A, Rahman S, Raquib M (2009). Electronic 
transaction of internet banking and its perception of Malaysian online 
customers. Afr. J. Bus. Manage., 3(6): 248-259. 
Hashim F, Alam G, Siraj S (2010). Information and communication 
technology for participatory based decision-making-E-management 
for administrative efficiency in Higher Education. Int. J. Phys. Sci., 
5(4): 383-392. 
Hassinen M, Markovski S (2003). Secure SMS messaging using 
Quasigroup encryption and Java SMS API. In:  SPLST’03, Finland. 
Hassinen M (2006). Java based Public Key Infrastructure for SMS 
Messaging. Information and Communication Technologies, 2006. 
ICTTA’06. 2nd, 1. 
Hoffstein J, Pipher J, Silverman JH (1998). NTRU: A Ring Based Public 
Key Cryptosystem. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1423: 267-
288. 
Jimale MA (2008). Securing Mobile Communications Using Public Key 
Infrastructure for Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS). University 
Malaya, p. 70. 
Kuen LN (2008). Mobile Messaging Using Public Key Infrastructure: M-
PKI. University Malaya.  
Shittu LAJ, Zachariah MP, Ajayi G, Oguntola JA, Izegbu MC, Ashiru OA 
(2007). Knowledge and perception of health workers towards tele-
medicine application in a new teaching hospital in Lagos. Sci. Res. 
Essays, 2(1): 016-019. 
Lison! k D, Drahansk!  M (2008). SMS Encryption for Mobile 
Communication. Security Technology, 2008. SECTECH ’08. 
International Conference on.., pp. 198-201. 
Narendiran C, Albert Rabara S, Rajendran N (2009). Public key 
infrastructure for mobile banking security. Paper presented at the 
Global Mobile Congress.  
Nokia (2009). Device comparison from 
http://www.forum.nokia.com/Tools_Docs_and_Code/deviceComparis
on.xhtml?dev=[N70,N93i,N73,5800_XpressMusic] 
<http://www.forum.nokia.com/Tools_Docs_and_Code/deviceCompari
son.xhtml?dev=%5bN70,N93i,N73,5800_XpressMusic%5d> 
NTRUCryptosystems (2003). NTRU Neo for Java Programming 
Interface, Version 3.51. 
Ratshinanga H, Lo  J,  Bishop  J (2004).  A   Security   Mechanism   for  
 3466            Sci. Res. Essays 
 
 
 
Secure SMS Communication. 
Stallings W (2005). Cryptography and Network Security Principles and 
Practices. 
Toorani M, Shirazi AAB (2008). SSMS - A Secure SMS Messaging 
Protocol for the M-Payment Systems. 
Wu S, Tan C (2009a). High Security Communication Protocol for SMS, 
2: 53-56 
Wu S, Tan C (2009b). A High Security Framework for SMS. Paper 
presented at the Biomedical Engineering and Informatics, 2009. 
BMEI '09. 2nd International Conference, pp. 1 - 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zhao S, Aggarwal A, Liu S (2008). Building Secure User-to-user 
Messaging in Mobile Telecommunication Networks. Wireless 
Telecommunications Symposium, WTS 2008, pp. 151-157. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
